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The Contraception Mandate Accommodated:
Why the RFRA Claim in Zubik v. Burwell Fails
By Caroline Mala Corbin
Introduction
Does filing paperwork in order to obtain a religious exemption from a law constitute a substantial
burden on religious liberty? That is the main question posed by Zubik v. Burwell, which the Supreme
Court is slated to hear on March 23, 2016. In Zubik, which consolidates several different cases,1
religiously affiliated nonprofit employers argue that the Affordable Care Act’s contraception
mandate2 violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) by substantially burdening their
religious conscience.3 Under RFRA, religious objectors need not comply with any federal law that
imposes a substantial religious burden unless the government can demonstrate that the law passes
strict scrutiny.4 Notably, the contraception mandate actually exempts the nonprofits from its
requirements. Nonetheless, these employers complain that even informing the government that they
seek an exemption makes them complicit in the sin of contraception and therefore amounts to a
substantial religious burden.5 Their claim should fail. Filing paperwork to obtain a religious

1

Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Geneva College v. U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015); E. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015); Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015).
2 While the ACA guarantee of cost-free contraception might be better described as "the birth control benefit" or "the
contraception coverage guarantee," this issue brief follows the courts and uses the term "the contraception mandate."
3 The challenge is a statutory rather than constitutional challenge. RFRA offers more expansive protection than the Free
Exercise Clause. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court
held that if a law is neutral and generally applicably—that is, if a law does not target religion for adverse treatment and
applies broadly—then it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Given that the goal of the contraception mandate is
to improve health care and not to penalize religious organizations, most courts to address the free exercise question have
found the mandate to be neutral and generally applicable. See, e.g., Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 267-69; Little Sisters of the Poor
Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1196-99.
4
Under RFRA, the federal government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability” unless “it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1.
5
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals described this claim as “extraordinary and potentially far reaching.” Priests for Life,
772 F.3d at 245.
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exemption does not constitute a substantial burden on religion. If it did, then almost anything would
amount to a substantial religious burden.
Because there is no RFRA violation without a substantial religious burden, the analysis could end
there. However, if the simple procedure for receiving a religious exemption were treated as a
substantial burden, then the next question in Zubik would be whether the contraception mandate
passes strict scrutiny. Under RFRA, laws that satisfy strict scrutiny must be obeyed, regardless of the
religious burdens imposed. To pass strict scrutiny, the government’s goal must be of the highest
order, and there cannot be another way to accomplish that goal. Given the importance of women’s
equal access to essential health care, and the exemption granted to the nonprofits, the mandate does
in fact meet the requirements of strict scrutiny, thereby providing a second reason why the
nonprofits’ RFRA claim should fail.

I. The Case: Zubik v. Burwell
A. The Contraception Mandate
The contraception mandate is part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA requires that
employer-sponsored health insurance plans cover basic preventive care without any cost-sharing– no
deductibles or co-pays. To help determine what preventive services to include, the Department of
Health and Human Services commissioned a study from the independent Institute of Medicine.6
Finding contraception to be vital to women’s health, the Institute of Medicine recommended that
preventive care include FDA-approved contraception.7
Zubik v. Burwell is not the first RFRA challenge to the contraception mandate. In 2014, the Supreme
Court ruled in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Burwell that under RFRA, closely-held for-profit
corporations with religious objections to contraception are entitled to an exemption from the
mandate. Hobby Lobby focused on for-profit companies because nonprofit organizations had already
been accommodated. First, the mandate does not apply to houses of worship or other “religious
employers” as defined by the IRS. Thus, religious institutions that predominately serve and employ
people of their own faith—such as churches, synagogues, and mosques—are completely exempt.
Second, religiously affiliated non-profit institutions that employ people of many different faiths and
often accept significant funding from the federal and state governments—such as schools, hospitals,
nursing homes, and social service providers8—do not have to pay for contraception or even include
6

The Institute of Medicine is an arm of the National Academy of Sciences tasked with “help[ing] those in government
and the private sector make informed health decisions by providing evidence upon which they can rely.” See About the
IOM, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, http://iom.nationalacademies.org/About-IOM.aspx#sthash.pZMs5sBa.dpuf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2016).
7
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS (2011),
https://iom.nationalacademies.org/Reports/2011/Clinical-Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-the-Gaps.aspx
[hereinafter CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN].
8
Among complaining nonprofits are social services providers such as Catholic Charities of South East Texas, Catholic
Charities of Fort Worth, Catholic Charities of Erie, and Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, and several
schools including East Texas Baptist University, Houston Baptist University, University of Dallas, Southern Nazarene
University, Oklahoma Baptist University, Mid-America Christian University, Thomas Aquinas College, Catholic
University, Geneva College, and Erie Catholic Cathedral Preparatory School.

The Contraception Mandate Accommodated: Why the RFRA Claim in Zubik v. Burwell Fails | 2

The American Constitution Society for Law and Policy

it in their health care plans. Instead, once a religiously affiliated nonprofit declares its religious
opposition to contraception, the responsibility for contraception coverage passes to its insurance
carrier: the nonprofit’s health care insurer or, if the nonprofit is self-insured, a third-party
administrator must provide and pay for a separate policy. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby
pointed to this accommodation as a reason why the contraception mandate’s application to religious
for-profits like Hobby Lobby was not narrowly tailored.9 If this accommodation worked for
religious nonprofits, the Court suggested, then why not for religious for-profits?
A nonprofit may obtain its exemption in two ways. It can either sign a short self-certification
declaring that it is a religious nonprofit that “opposes providing coverage for some or all of any
contraceptive services that would otherwise be required to be covered” and mail the form to its
health insurance company (or its third-party administrator for self-insured plans),10 or the nonprofit
may provide a similar notice, along with the name and contact information of its insurer (or thirdparty administrator), directly to the Department of Health and Human Services.

B. The Claim
Despite the ability to opt out of contraception coverage, multiple religiously affiliated nonprofit
employers complain that the religious accommodation itself imposes a substantial religious burden
in violation of RFRA. According to these employers, signing a two-page form or sending a letter
triggers the provision of contraception to their employees, thus making the employer complicit in
sin. For example, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged argues that to facilitate contraception
use “would violate their public witness to the sanctity of human life and human dignity.”11 Other
nonprofits argue that “taking the actions required of them under the regulations would make them
complicit in wrongdoing and create ‘scandal’ in violation of Catholic moral teaching.”12 The sincerity
of their objections is not in question.
All but one of the courts of appeals to consider the claim (including the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Tenth, and the D.C. Circuits) has held that filing the exemption paperwork does not
impose a substantial religious burden. Most decisions stop there, since RFRA only protects against
substantial burdens on religion. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals added that, despite the
nonprofits’ claim that the contraception mandate neither advances a compelling state interest nor is
narrowly tailored, the mandate does in fact pass strict scrutiny.13

9

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014) (“[T]he HHS regulations fail the least-restrictivemeans test. HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive than requiring
employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs.”).
10
This two-sided, single sheet of paper is known as EBSA Form 700. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged,
794 F.3d at 1207(reprinting form).
11
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1167.
12
Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, & 14-1505 at 2, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioners 1].
13
See, e.g., Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 256-67.
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II. Substantial Burden Analysis
A. Substantial Burden Is A Legal Question for Courts to Decide
Who decides what counts as a substantial religious burden for purposes of RFRA is central to the
substantial burden analysis in Zubik.14 The nonprofits claiming a RFRA violation insist that
substantial burden is a subjective religious question for the religious objector to decide. They assert
that once a religious objector claims that a particular statutory requirement amounts to a substantial
burden as a matter of religious belief, then, as long as they are sincere,15 it amounts to a substantial
burden under RFRA as a matter of law. According to them, “courts have neither the authority nor the
competence to second-guess the reasonableness of those sincere beliefs.”16 Failure to defer to the
objectors’ assessment of substantial burden is akin to passing judgment on their religious faith,
which is barred by the Establishment Clause.17
Most circuit courts have rightly rejected this claim. Automatic deference to religious objectors
seeking religious exemptions (1) misreads the language of RFRA and (2) overlooks the courts’
authority to rule on factual and legal matters that are well within their institutional authority and
competence. Ultimately, “[w]hether a law imposes a substantial burden on a party is something that
a court must decide, not something that a party may simply allege.”18

1. RFRA’s Language
As RFRA’s language makes explicit, strict scrutiny is triggered only by substantial burdens on
religion, not all burdens on religion. To simply assume a substantial burden whenever a sincere
religious objector claims one exists essentially reads the substantial burden requirement out of
RFRA. “If plaintiffs could assert and establish that a burden is ‘substantial’ without any possibility of
judicial scrutiny, the word ‘substantial’ would become wholly devoid of independent meaning.”19
Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find exemption-seekers likely to argue that a challenged law
burdens their practice of religion, but not substantially.
Without some objective evaluation of burden, all burdens imposed by federal laws would become
eligible for accommodation. For example, D.C. parishioners could argue that issuing traffic tickets
or adding a bicycle lane in front of their church imposes a substantial religious burden on them by

14

E. Texas Baptist Univ., 793 F.3d at 456 (“A preliminary question—at the heart of this case—is the extent to which the
courts defer to a religious objector's view on whether there is a substantial burden.”).
15
RFRA only protects sincere religious beliefs; the sincerity of the nonprofits’ beliefs is not at issue in Zubik.
16
Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, & 15-191 at 2, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016).
17 Cf. Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 887 (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”); Hernandez v.
C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”).
18 Mich. Catholic Conference & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 747 (6th Cir. 2015).
19
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1176; see also Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207,
218 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he fact that a RFRA plaintiff considers a regulatory burden substantial does not make it a
substantial burden. Were it otherwise, no burden would be insubstantial.”).
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making it much more difficult to park for Sunday services.20 In short, every sincere religious
protestor would be entitled to a religious exemption from any federal law that did not pass strict
scrutiny.21

2. Courts’ Authority
Although courts cannot and should not rule on theological questions, claims of substantial religious
burden often depend on purely secular factual and legal assumptions courts can and should resolve.
For example, imagine a vegetarian opposed to a compulsory vaccination law because her religion
condemns killing animals and she thinks (erroneously) that the mandated vaccine contains animals.
She argues she is entitled to a religious exemption because facilitating any animal death imposes a
substantial burden on her religious conscience. Although she believes that animals were killed in the
manufacture of the vaccine, she is wrong. She has made a factual mistake: vaccine production does
not involve animals at all. While it would be inappropriate for a court to question whether her
religion truly bans all animal slaughter, it is well within a court’s competence to find that the vaccine
is animal-free and therefore simply does not implicate the vegetarian’s sincere religious opposition to
animal slaughter. In short, while courts may not draw conclusions about the objector’s religion, they
should draw conclusions about the underlying legal or, as in this hypothetical, factual, bases for the
religious claims.
In fact, courts possess not only the ability but also the responsibility to evaluate whether burdens are
substantial enough to merit accommodation under RFRA, including the burdens caused by the
contraception mandate’s regulatory scheme. After all, it is not just the rights of religiously affiliated
nonprofit employers that are at stake, but the rights of those who may be affected by a religious
accommodation, such as the nonprofits’ employees and students. In any event, subjecting to strict
scrutiny laws that impose only negligible burdens on those seeking to circumvent them is not the
balance RFRA, with its substantial burden requirement, envisions. And as the next part explains, the
religious burden in this case is indeed slight, notwithstanding the sincere beliefs of the religious
objectors.

B. The Mandate’s Accommodation Does Not Impose A Substantial Burden
In evaluating whether the contraception mandate regulatory scheme imposes a substantial burden on
the objecting nonprofit employers, it is important to remember that the objection is not to
mandatory contraception coverage but to the mechanism allowing them to opt-out of contraception
coverage. This accommodation makes Zubik v. Burwell fundamentally different from Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc v. Burwell, where the for-profit company was not excused from providing contraception
coverage. Here, in contrast, no religiously affiliated nonprofit is required to include any

20

Cf. Perry Stein, D.C. Church Says a Bike Lane Would Infringe upon its Constitutional ‘Rights of Religious Freedom’, WASH. POST,
Oct. 14, 2015.
21
Catholic Health Care Sys., 796 F.3d at 218 (“If RFRA plaintiffs needed only to assert that their religious beliefs were
substantially burdened, federal courts would be reduced to rubber stamps, and the government would have to defend
innumerable actions under demanding strict scrutiny analysis.”).
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objectionable contraception in its health care plan.22 Instead, all such entities must do is provide
notice of their objections and the name and address of their insurance company or third-party
administrator if they notify the Department of Health and Human Services instead of their
insurance carriers.23
The opt-out procedure relieves the religiously affiliated nonprofit employers of all responsibility for
contraception coverage.24 Once a nonprofit expresses its objection, the law shifts responsibility to
the insurance companies, who are required to step in and provide, pay for, and inform employees
and students of the separate contraception coverage they are offering. The insurance company’s
contraception policy is unconnected to the nonprofit’s health care plan. Moreover, the regulations
forbid the insurance company from charging the nonprofits in any way for the costs of the
contraception. Finally, the insurance company’s notice to employees and students must be separate
from any materials distributed on behalf of the nonprofit, and it must clarify that the nonprofit plays
no part in the contraception coverage. “In sum, both opt-out mechanisms let eligible organizations
extricate themselves fully from the burden of providing contraceptive coverage to employees, pay
nothing toward such coverage, and have the providers tell the employees that their employers play
no role and in no way should be seen to endorse the coverage.”25
At the most basic level, the objecting nonprofits misunderstand how the contraception mandate
works. Their belief that they are complicit in the sin of contraception use rests on the assumption
that their written refusal triggers the provision of contraception. For example, one college argues
“that as the trigger-puller or facilitator the college shares responsibility for the extension of
[contraception] coverage to its students, faculty, and staff.”26As a matter of law, they are wrong.27
Their paperwork does not cause contraception coverage. The Affordable Care Act does. It is federal
law, not the completion of any form, that creates the insurance companies’ obligation to cover
contraception. All the paperwork does is extricate the nonprofit organizations from the coverage.28

22

Cf. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1171 (“Before we present our analysis of the issues, we wish to
highlight the unusual nature of Plaintiffs’ central claim, which attacks the Government’s attempt to accommodate
religious exercise by providing a means to opt out of compliance with a generally applicable law.”).
23
See, e.g., Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 237 (noting that “[t]hat bit of paperwork is more straightforward and minimal than
many that are staples of nonprofit organizations' compliance with law in the modern administrative state.”).
24
See, e.g., Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 236 (“Delivery of the requisite notice extinguishes the religious organization’s
obligation to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for any coverage that includes contraception.”).
25
Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 250.
26
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 435 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The appellees’ essential challenge is that providing the selfcertification form to the insurance issuer or third-party administrator ‘triggers’ the provision of the contraceptive
coverage to their employees and students.”).
27
The circuit courts did not mince their words in rejecting this assumption. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794
F.3d at 1180 (“They do not.”); E. Texas Baptist Univ., 793 F.3d at 459 (“Not so.”); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786
F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2015) (“That’s not correct.”); see also Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 438 (“However, this purported
causal connection is nonexistent.”); Mich. Catholic Conference & Catholic Family Servs., 807 F.3d at 750 (“Plaintiffs are
fundamentally wrong in their understanding of how the law actually works.”).
28
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1173-74 (“Although Plaintiffs allege the administrative tasks
required to opt out of the Mandate make them complicit in the overall delivery scheme, opting out instead relieves them
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“By participating in the accommodation, the eligible organization has no role whatsoever in the
provision of the objected-to contraceptive services.”29
Equally erroneous is the nonprofits’ claim that the accommodation forces them to facilitate
contraception use because the government essentially commandeers their health care plans. In fact,
as explained, the government exempts their plans. Instead, it requires the insurance companies—
private insurance carriers like Aetna and Blue Cross/Blue Shield—to issue separate plans. “So when
[a nonprofit] tells us that it is being ‘forced’ to allow ‘use’ of its health plans to cover emergency
contraceptives, it is wrong. It's being ‘forced’ only to notify its insurers (including third-party
administrators), whether directly or by notifying the government … that it will not use its health
plans.”30
Thus, the courts’ rejection of the complicity claim does not turn on any evaluation of the religious
doctrine of complicity.31 Rather, it stems entirely from the courts’ rejection of the erroneous legal
conclusions on which the complicity claim is based. As Judge Posner observed, “[t]his is an issue not
of moral philosophy but of federal law. Federal courts are not required to treat [the nonprofit’s]
erroneous legal interpretation as beyond their reach.”32 Whatever deference might be owed to a
nonprofit’s interpretation of its own religious beliefs, courts should not defer to the nonprofit’s
interpretation of federal law.33 After all, if there is one area over which federal courts have authority,
it is the interpretation of federal law. The nonprofits’ opposition is based on legal error.34 Courts

from complicity.”); Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 441 (“Far from ‘triggering’ the provision of contraceptive coverage to the
appellees’ employees and students, EBSA Form 700 totally removes the appellees from providing those services.”).
29
Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 438.
30
Wheaton Coll., 791 F.3d at 795.
31
Cf. Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 435 (“Without testing the appellees’ religious beliefs, we must nonetheless objectively
assess whether the appellees’ compliance with the self-certification procedure does, in fact, trigger, facilitate, or make
them complicit in the provision of contraceptive coverage.”).
32
Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 623; see also id. (“[T]he courts cannot substitute even the most sincere religious beliefs
for legal analysis.”).
33
Cf. Id.at 612 (“Although Notre Dame is the final arbiter of its religious beliefs, it is for the courts to determine
whether the law actually forces Notre Dame to act in a way that would violate those beliefs”); Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at
436 (“[T]here is nothing about RFRA or First Amendment jurisprudence that requires the Court to accept [the
appellees’] characterization of the regulatory scheme on its face.” (quoting Mich. Catholic Conference & Catholic Family
Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 385 (6th Cir. 2014)).
34
Mistakes of law are not the only errors underlying the nonprofits complicity claims. Some of the objecting nonprofits
such as East Texas Baptist University and Oklahoma Baptist University are not religiously opposed to contraception but
are opposed to abortion. Their objections to the mandate flow from the erroneous belief that four of the FDA-approved
contraceptives act as abortifacients and kill fertilized eggs. However, neither of the two morning after pills, Plan B and
Ella, work in the way the nonprofits think the medicine works. Although the FDA approved them before fully
understanding whether they prevented fertilization or implantation, every reputable scientific study to examine the pills’
mechanism has concluded that these pills prevent ovulation—and therefore fertilization—from occurring in the first
place. See, e.g., , Mechanism of Action: How Do Levonorgestrel-Only Emergency Contraception Pills (LNG ECPs) Prevent Pregnancy,
INT’L FED’N OF GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS (FIGO) & INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION
(2011), http://www.figo.org/sites/default/files/uploads/MOA_FINAL_2011_ENG.pdf (summarizing studies); James
Trussell et al., Emergency Contraception: A Last Chance to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy, PRINCETON UNIV. (Jan. 2016),
http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ec-review.pdf (same); see also Wheaton Coll., 791 F.3d at 795 (“There is no evidence to
suggest that either of the FDA-approved emergency contraceptive options . . . works after an egg is fertilized.”). In sum,
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should not be, and for the most part have not been, deferential when they encounter obvious legal
error.35

III. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Even if the contraception mandate substantially burdened the nonprofits’ religious beliefs, RFRA
specifically provides that such burdens must be tolerated if the law in question passes strict scrutiny.
This one does. The contraception mandate advances compelling government interests, and the
accommodation provided to objecting nonprofits is the least restrictive means of accomplishing
those interests.

A. Compelling State Interest
Although the Hobby Lobby majority assumed without deciding that the contraception mandate
advances compelling state goals, five Justices (the four dissenters plus Justice Kennedy) have stated
that the contraception mandate passes the first prong of the strict scrutiny test. Granted, Justice
Kennedy’s controlling concurrence was somewhat tepid, but he did acknowledge that the mandate
furthers “a compelling interest in the health of female employees.”36 Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the dissenters, emphasized that “the Government has shown that the [mandate] furthers compelling
interests in public health and women’s well-being. Those interests are concrete, specific, and
demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence.”37
Contraception is crucial to women’s health—over 99 percent of women who have ever had sex have
relied on contraception. By preventing unintended pregnancies, birth control allows women to
better space their children. Contraception also improves prenatal care, which can help prevent
complications, because women with unintended pregnancies receive later and less adequate prenatal
care.38 Pregnancy carries with it a host of risks, and is contraindicated for women with certain health
issues.39 Furthermore, contraception is not only used to prevent pregnancy. For example, millions of
American women use hormonal birth control mainly to manage a host of medical issues.40 The

the scientific consensus is that morning-after pills prevent fertilization, not implantation. As with legal error, courts
should not be deferential when they encounter obvious scientific error.
35
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1191 (“RFRA does not require us to defer to their erroneous view
about the operation of the ACA and its implementing regulations.”).
36
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2785-86 (“As to RFRA’s first requirement, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) makes the case that the mandate serves the Government’s
compelling interest in providing insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the health of female employees, coverage
that is significantly more costly than for a male employee.”).
37
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
38
See INST. OF MEDICINE, THE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES 66 (National Academies Press ed., 1995).
39
CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN, supra note 7, at 103-04 (pregnancy contraindicated for women with
pulmonary hypertension and cyanotic heart disease).
40
Rachel K. Jones, Beyond Birth Control: The Overlooked Benefits of Oral Contraceptive Pills, GUTTMACHER INST., (Nov. 2011),
available at https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Beyond-Birth-Control.pdf (oral contraception helps relieve Polycystic
Ovary Syndrome, endometriosis, acne, hirsutism, bleeding due to uterine fibroids, amenorrhea, excessive menstrual
bleeding (menorrhagia), and severe menstrual pain (dysmenorrhea)).
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Institute of Medicine recommended that contraception be fully covered precisely because it is so
essential to women’s well-being.
Contraception is also essential to women’s autonomy and equality. Women cannot be autonomous
agents without the power to decide what happens to their own bodies, and women cannot be equal
participants in the social, economic, and political life of this country without the ability to control
when or whether to have children.41 There is also a strong argument—and one endorsed by the
EEOC—that a health insurance plan that covers basic preventive care without covering
contraception, which only women and almost all women rely on, amounts to sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII.42 If nothing else, as Justice Kennedy noted in his Hobby Lobby concurrence,
women have long been paying more for their health care than men.43 Studies reveal that “in general,
women of childbearing age spend 68% more in out-of-pocket heath care costs than men.”44
The nonprofits argue that even though women’s health and equality may be compelling interests, the
contraception mandate cannot be said to advance those interests given all the exceptions to it. They
point out that grandfathered plans, employers with fewer than fifty employees, and houses of
worship are all exempt from the mandate. They maintain that all these exemptions undermine the
government’s claim that providing no-cost contraception to students and employees is truly a
compelling interest.
To start, the nonprofits overstate the reach of the mandate’s exemptions. First, the rule regarding
the grandfathered plans is less an exemption than a measure “designed to ease the transition of the
healthcare industry into the reforms established by the [ACA] by allowing for gradual
implementation.”45 In addition to the fact that grandfathered plans have been steadily losing their
grandfathered status,46 most grandfathered plans include contraception. Twenty-eight states had
their own contraception mandate before the ACA,47 and one study found that more than 89% of
insurance plans already covered contraception.48 Second, the exemption for small employers is not
an exemption from the contraception mandate but from the ACA’s health care requirement. Any
41

Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (“The ability of women to participate
equally in the social and economic life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”).
42
If an employer provides health insurance, it cannot discriminate against employees based on their sex, race, or other
protected characteristic in its provision. Thus, an employer cannot offer health insurance against all cancers except
testicular cancer, or all diseases except those that mainly affect Jews, or all preventive care except care that predominately
affects women.
43
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that prior to the Affordable Care Act, insurance for a
female employee was “significantly more costly than for a male employee”).
44
155 Cong. Rec. 28,843 (2009) (statement of Sen. Gillibrand); see 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,887 (July 2, 2013).
45
75 Fed. Reg. at 34541(July 17, 2010).
46
The percentage of employees in grandfathered plans has already dropped from 56% in 2011 to 25% in 2015. HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2015 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY (Sept. 2015), http://buff.ly/1SogmzO.
47
Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 865-66 n.8 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (citing NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW
CENTER, GUARANTEEING COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTIVES: PAST & PRESENT (Aug. 1, 2012)).
48
78 Fed. Reg. at 39873 (July 2, 2013) (citing A. Sonfield, et al., U.S. Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives and the Impact of
Contraceptive Coverage Mandates, 36(2) PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 72–79 (2002)). The
mandate makes sure this contraception coverage does not require cost-sharing.
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small employer that does offer health care to its employees must comply with the mandate. Finally,
for religiously affiliated nonprofits to point to the government’s attempt to accommodate churches
and other houses of worship as evidence that the government lacks a compelling interest seems
more chutzpah49 than anything else.50
In any event, the existence of exemptions is far from dispositive in assessing the strength of a
government interest. Admittedly, the number of exemptions might matter in the face of uncertainty
about the importance of the state’s interest. For example, when asking for the first time whether the
uniform appearance of police officers is truly a compelling state interest, countless exceptions to the
dress code may undercut claims that it is. But when the state’s interests have long been recognized as
compelling—such as promoting the health and equality of women—the existence of exceptions
should not change that recognition.
The number of exemptions might also matter if they are so numerous that they raise questions
about whether the government’s asserted goal is really just a pretext for some illegitimate purpose.
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,51 for example, the city’s claim that its ban on animal
slaughter was designed to promote animal welfare was belied by exemptions for every kind of
animal slaughter except religious sacrifice—the sacramental practice of the Santeria church planning
to move into the city. No such religious targeting is at issue here.
Moreover, plenty of laws have been held to advance compelling interests despite their various
exemptions. Indeed, most major laws contain exceptions. Title VII does not apply to small
employers and its ban on religious discrimination does not apply to nonprofit religious
organizations, yet no one would dispute that it advances the government’s compelling interest in
ending discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, or religion. Along those lines,
the Supreme Court has held that maintaining the uniformity of the tax code is a compelling
government interest,52 despite the tax code being fairly riddled with exceptions compared to the
contraception mandate. In short, the lack of universal contraception coverage does not undermine
the government’s compelling interests behind the contraception mandate.53

B. Narrow Tailoring
As for narrow tailoring, it is difficult to picture a less intrusive alternative for religiously affiliated
nonprofit employers than excusing them from all responsibility for contraception coverage after
49

“[C]hutzpah is when a man kills both his parents and begs the court for mercy because he’s an orphan.” Alex
Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Lawsuit, Shmawsuit, 103 YALE L.J. 463, 467 (1993).
50
Furthermore, although one might quibble with it, churches and other houses of worship have long been accorded
special treatment in religion jurisprudence. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (recognizing ministerial exception from anti-discrimination law for church employers).
51
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
52
See, e.g., Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. at 699-700 (“[A] substantial [religious] burden would be justified by the ‘broad
public interest in maintaining a sound tax system . . .’”) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)).
53
Moreover, as the government points out, to hold otherwise would mean that none of the required preventive services
could be considered compelling, including cancer screenings and child immunizations. Brief for the Respondents at 63,
Zubik v. Burwell, No.14-1418 (U.S. Feb 10, 2016) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
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they certify that they are a religious nonprofit whose faith requires them to exclude contraception
from their health care plan. As previously noted, in finding that the mandate as applied to for-profit
companies failed strict scrutiny, the Hobby Lobby majority pointed to the nonprofit accommodation
as a less restrictive means for the government to achieve the mandate’s goals. While the Supreme
Court was careful to reserve its final judgment for a later day,54 it nonetheless observed, “[a]t a
minimum, however, [the nonprofit accommodation] does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious
belief that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion,
and it serves HHS’s stated interests equally well.”55 Justice Kennedy wrote that the nonprofit
accommodation “equally furthers the Government’s interest but does not impinge on the plaintiffs’
religious beliefs.”56 Given that the accommodation itself constitutes a less restrictive alternative, it is
hard to imagine that there is a less restrictive alternative to the accommodation.
Nevertheless, the religiously affiliated nonprofits proffer a list of possible alternatives. Among the
proposed alternatives is that the federal government supply the contraception itself—never mind
that Congress intended the ACA to build upon the existing system of employment-based insurance57
or that the odds of Congress creating and funding a new program of no-cost contraception is close
to nil in the current political climate.58 Moreover, even assuming a hypothetical Federal
Contraception Bureau,59 the suggestion that a less restrictive alternative to any law requiring a private
actor to provide a benefit or service is for the government to provide it instead is highly radical.
Imagine a medical practice that refuses to see black patients, or an employer whose health insurance
covers cancer screenings for white employees but not Asian ones. Now imagine that the medical
practice or employer argues that a law banning race discrimination in public accommodations or
employment benefits is not narrowly tailored because the government could directly provide the
services/benefits instead. Similar claims about lack of narrow tailoring could be leveled against just
about any civil rights or employment or benefits law.60 Just as they should be rejected in those
contexts, the nonprofits’ claim should be rejected here.

54

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (“We do not decide today whether an approach of this type complies with RFRA for
purposes of all religious claims.”). Although a few days later the Court granted an emergency injunction against the
original accommodation, it suggested that the letter-to-HHS alternative was acceptable. The Court also cautioned that
“this order should not be construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits.” Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134
S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014).
55
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
56 Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57
Cf. Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 625 (“The heart of the Affordable Care Act was a decision to approach universal
health insurance by expanding the employer-based system of private health insurance that had evolved in our country,
rather than to substitute a new ‘single payer’ government program.”).
58
In its brief, the government explains that none of the proposed alternatives “is currently available, and all would
require new legislation.” Brief for Respondents, supra note 53, at 76; see also id. at 28 (“[T]he legal authority to implement
those alternatives does not now exist.”).
59 Cf. Wheaton Coll., 791 F.3d at 798 (imagining a hypothetical “Emergency Contraception Bureau in the Department of
Health & Human Services”).
60 Cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]here is the stopping point to the ‘let the government
pay’ alternative?”).
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Moreover, a proposed alternative is not a less restrictive alternative if it fails to accomplish the
government’s goals. The Hobby Lobby Court approved of the nonprofit accommodation because the
Justices believed that it would not disrupt students’ or employees’ health care. Mindful of the
Supreme Court’s longstanding disapproval of granting religious exemptions that impose burdens on
others,61 the majority emphasized that “[u]nder the accommodation, the plaintiffs’ female employees
would continue to receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved
contraceptives, and they would continue to face minimal logistical and administrative obstacles
because their employers’ insurers would be responsible for providing information and coverage.”62
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby repeated more than once that “HHS has already devised
and implemented a system that seeks to respect the religious liberty of religious nonprofit
corporations while ensuring that the employees of these entities have precisely the same access to all
FDA-approved contraceptives.”63
Unlike the challenged accommodation, which according to the Supreme Court would have
“precisely zero” effect on women,64 the same could not be said for the nonprofits’ proposals, which
range from women buying a special contraception-only plan on the exchanges,65 to women
obtaining contraception from an expanded Title X program, to offering tax credits or
reimbursements to women who purchase it themselves. On the contrary, these proposed alternatives
“would add steps—requiring women to identify different providers or reimbursement sources,
enroll in additional and unfamiliar programs, pay out of pocket and wait for reimbursement, or file
for tax credits (assuming their income made them eligible)—or pose other financial, logistical,

61

In praising the balance struck by the nonprofit accommodation in Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy observed: “Among
the reasons the United States is so open, so tolerant, and so free is that no person may be restricted or demeaned by
government in exercising his or her religion. Yet neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other persons, such as employees,
in protecting their own interests, interests the law deems compelling.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786-87 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). The dissent was more direct in highlighting that religious accommodations, whether
under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA, may not substantially burden others: “Accommodations to religious beliefs or
observances, the Court has clarified, must not significantly impinge on the interests of third parties.” Id. at 2790
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In other words, “‘[y]our right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose
begins.’” Id. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In support, the dissent cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which
granted a religious exemption from mandatory school attendance laws for Amish teens after noting that “[t]his case, of
course, is not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or
welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred,” id. at 230, and Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703 (1985), which rejected a mandatory accommodation for Sabbath observers because it burdened the employer and
other employees. In fact, the Supreme Court held the accommodation violated the Establishment Clause in part because
of the burdens imposed on others, id. at 710-11. See also id. at 710 (“The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to
insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.”).
62
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
63
Id. at 2759.
64
Id. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby Lobby and the other
companies involved in these cases would be precisely zero.”); see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 245 (“In holding that
Hobby Lobby must be accommodated, the Supreme Court repeatedly underscored that the effect on women's
contraceptive coverage of extending the accommodation to the complaining businesses ‘would be precisely zero.’”).
65
“Perhaps the most obvious solution would be for the Government to offer women . . . the opportunity to sign up for
separate, contraceptive-only health plans on the ACA exchange.” Brief for Petitioners 1, supra note 12, at 75.
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informational, and administrative burdens.”66 Such disruption is especially problematic for
contraception services because, as the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized, “[t]he evidence
shows that contraceptive use is highly vulnerable to even seemingly minor obstacles.”67 Thus, the
contraception mandate, with its accommodation for religiously affiliated nonprofit employers, is the
least restrictive way to accomplish the government’s compelling interests, and should be deemed to
pass strict scrutiny.

IV. Conclusion
The religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations argue that their religion bars them from providing
contraception. The existing contraception mandate regime ensures that they do not have to. Instead,
an accommodation allows the nonprofits to opt-out. Once they give notice, the sole responsibility
shifts to third parties to fulfill the contraception mandate. The nonprofits argue that this religious
accommodation still forces them to facilitate sin because their notice triggers contraception coverage
by their health insurance infrastructure. As a matter of federal law, they are simply wrong. Although
courts must defer to religious objectors’ interpretation of their religious beliefs, they need not and
should not defer to their interpretation of federal law. Because the accommodation does not impose
a substantial religious burden, the nonprofits RFRA claim must fail. RFRA, after all, was not meant
to shield religious observers from any and all burdens on their religion, no matter how slight.
Moreover, the contraception mandate regime easily passes strict scrutiny. In fact, as the Supreme
Court has implicitly recognized, the existing accommodation, which “seeks to respect the religious
liberty of religious nonprofit corporations while ensuring that the employees of these entities have
precisely the same access to all FDA-approved contraceptives,”68 strikes a balance between the
nonprofits’ sincere beliefs and the government’s compelling interests. To find otherwise would
essentially grant the nonprofits veto power over the government’s own internal actions, and as the
Second Circuit noted, “The rights conferred by … RFRA do not include a right to have the
government or third parties behave in a manner that comports with an individual's religious
beliefs.”69 This is especially true when the additional accommodation sought would impose on the
rights of students and employees who may not share the objectors’ religious beliefs. In sum,
“although a religious nonprofit organization may opt out from providing contraceptive coverage, it
cannot preclude the government from requiring others to provide the legally required coverage in its
stead.”70

66

Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 265; see also id. at 245 (“The relief Plaintiffs seek here, in contrast, would hinder women’s
access to contraception. It would either deny the contraceptive coverage altogether or, at a minimum, make the coverage
no longer seamless.”); Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 618 (“All of Notre Dame’s suggested alternatives would impose
significant financial, administrative, and logistical obstacles . . . .”).
67 Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 265; see also id. (“Imposing even minor added steps would dissuade women from obtaining
contraceptives and defeat the compelling interests in enhancing access to such coverage.”).
68
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
69
Catholic Health Care Sys., 796 F.3d at 226.
70
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1183.
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